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用户:Robmarotiz/乌拉圭战争

维基百科，自由的百科全书
乌拉圭战争
Campagne de l'Uruguay, prise de Paysandu. — D'après un croquis de notre correspondant spécial.
画报所绘《派桑杜攻城战》（英语：Siege of Paysandú），绘于1865年
日期1864年8月10日 -1865年2月20日 (6个月1周又3天)
地点
结果

巴西帝国和红党胜利

参战方
指挥官与领导者

乌拉圭战争，又称1864年巴西入侵[A]（1864年8月10日-1865年2月20日）是发生在乌拉圭白党政权和巴西帝国-乌拉圭红党（受到了阿根廷的秘密支援）同盟之间的战争。乌拉圭从独立起，就遭受着红白两党断断续续的夺权内斗带来的破坏。红党领袖贝南西奥·弗洛雷斯（英语：Venancio Flores）于1863年发起了旨在推翻红白联合政府的总统贝纳尔多·贝罗（英语：Bernardo Berro）的解放运动，并得到了阿根廷的支持。阿根廷总统巴托洛梅·米特雷给弗洛雷斯送去了补给、志愿者和军用河运载具。

联合政府最终因红党成员纷纷退出并加入弗洛雷斯的运动而崩溃。乌拉圭内战的战火逐步升级，演变成为破坏整个地区的稳定的国际危机。红党叛变前，联合政府内的白党就已经与巴拉圭独裁者弗朗西斯科·索拉诺·洛佩斯达成了同盟。联合政府崩溃后，反对米特雷和集权党的阿根廷联邦党（英语：Federales (Argentina)）向白党政府提供了支援。后来，巴西帝国也卷入了这场危机之中，令局势进一步恶化：巴西帝国认为五分之一的乌拉圭人是巴西人，而他们中的一些人因为对白党政府颁布的政策不满（他们认为那些政策损害了他们的利益），参与了红党的叛乱，所以，巴西帝国最终为了重建南方边境的安全和自己在那里的地区优势，决定干涉乌拉圭。

1864年4月，巴西派出全权代表（英语：Plenipotentiary）若泽·安东尼奥·萨赖瓦（英语：José Antônio Saraiva）与乌拉圭新总统阿塔纳西奥·阿吉雷（英语：Atanasio Aguirre）谈判。萨赖瓦最初试图平息红白两党之间的争端，然而，因为阿吉雷拒绝妥协弗洛雷斯的要求，萨赖瓦放弃了，选择站在红党这一边。1864年8月10日，白党政府拒绝了巴西的最后通牒，于是萨赖瓦宣布：巴西军队将对乌拉圭实施报复。巴西拒绝承认两国间正式的战争状态，并且在战争的大部分时间中，巴西都没有对乌拉圭宣战（英语：undeclared war）。

巴西-红党同盟对白党阵地的进攻十分顺利，他们穿越乌拉圭全境，攻占一座又一座城镇。最终，白党的阵地只剩下首都蒙得维的亚。于是，白党政府于1865年2月20日宣布投降。这场短暂的战争本应成为巴西和阿根廷的大捷之役，可是，随后巴拉圭在白党的支持下开始袭击巴西和阿根廷的领土，漫长而又代价高昂的巴拉圭战争就此爆发。

乌拉圭内战

红白党冲突

参见：乌拉圭内战
A map showing Uruguay and Paraguay in the center with Bolivia and Brazil to the north and Argentina to the south; cross-hatching indicates that the western half of Paraguay was claimed by Bolivia, the northern reaches of Argentina were disputed by Paraguay, and areas of southern Brazil were claimed by both Argentina and Paraguay
1864年的拉普拉塔平原，阴影区域为争议区。

南美洲的乌拉圭东岸共和国自从1828年独立起，就陷入了白党与红党的内斗之中。两党形成于19世纪30年代，产生于地方上的考迪罗们扶持的庇护关系，因此红白两党的内斗也蔓延到了乌拉圭全国。两党并非现代意义的政党，而只是参与内斗的两个派系。他们的团结并非来源于共同的民族主义情绪，而是从自身保守的政治框架中产生的目标与忠诚[1]

乌拉圭人口稀疏，政府控制力弱。[1]因此，普通的公民不得不寻求地方上的考迪罗的庇护。这些考迪罗要么是红党党员，要么是白党党员，他们将自己的工人（主要是高乔人骑手）组织成一支支私人部队。为了战胜对方，两党用尽各种残酷策略，比如没收土地、没收牲畜和处决，这就让两党间日益疏远。暴行造成的敌对，加上家族忠诚和政治关系，令两党间的和解成为不可思议之事。19世纪的后半期中，大量来到乌拉圭的欧洲移民也被卷入了两党间的冲突。两党内部都有自由派和保守派，所以都能与移民的社会观点和政治观点相调和。内斗还阻碍了乌拉圭中央政府的发展，使政府无法得到广泛的支持。[2][3]

1863年解放运动

Full-length photograph of a bearded man wearing a wide-brimmed hat, bandana, serape, leather boots and grasping the handle of a long knife in his left hand
被拉普拉塔平原的考迪罗当作士兵的高乔人骑手。

19世纪50年代的后五年中，红白两党的领袖们试图达成和解。两党在许多党员的赞同下颁布了许多“联合主义”政策，开始在政府和军队中合作，并取得了相当的成效。[4][2]然而，红党内部的反动派在1858年发起叛乱抵制联合计划，使得弥补分裂的进程遭受到挫折。最后，叛乱被时任乌拉圭联合政府总统（也是一位红党党员）加夫列尔·佩雷拉（英语：Gabriel Antonio Pereira）镇压。叛军领袖在内格罗河沿岸的帕索-德金特罗斯被处决，这却引发了新的冲突。红党开始怀疑与白党一起建设联合政府会危害到红党自身，因此，红党号召支持者们为“金特罗斯的烈士”复仇。[2][5]

随着联合政府内部的弱点逐渐暴露，红党开始令支持者们退出联合政府。红党领袖贝南西奥·弗洛雷斯（英语：Venancio Flores）准将是一名考迪罗和联合政府的早期拥护者，他发现自己缺乏发动持久叛乱的军事资源，于是前去求助阿根廷，希望阿根廷能够介入两党间的冲突。[6]

自从1852年，独裁者胡安·曼努埃尔·德·罗萨斯倒台起，阿根廷就分裂成了两国：阿根廷邦联和布宜诺斯艾利斯国。两国都在竞争国家的主导权。[7]弗洛雷斯与布宜诺斯艾利斯国国防部长巴托洛梅·米特雷相互交涉，达成了如下共识：红党将支持布宜诺斯艾利斯国争夺主导权，从而在红党攻击蒙得维的亚（乌拉圭首都）的联合政府时换取阿根廷的支持。[6]之后，弗洛雷斯和他的红党部队坚定的为布宜诺斯艾利斯服务，并在1861年9月17日的帕翁战役（英语：Battle of Pavón）中发挥了决定性的作用。在这场战役中，阿根廷邦联大败，布宜诺斯艾利斯国统一了阿根廷。

为了履行承诺，米特雷在1863年5月和6月用阿根廷的渡轮把红党民兵、阿根廷志愿军和补给送到了乌拉圭，又令阿根廷海军在沿途保卫渡轮不受乌拉圭炮舰机的攻击。回到祖国后，弗洛雷斯呼吁推翻贝纳尔多·贝罗（英语：Bernardo Berro）领导的宪政政府。弗洛雷斯还指控蒙得维的亚政府，说政府同情白党并污蔑自己的“解放运动”（他这么称呼自己的叛乱）是挑起红白内斗的行为。随后，来自农村的红党党员和军队中的叛逃者组织了起来，以响应弗洛雷斯的呼吁。[8]


国际冲突

巴拉圭与白党的关系

Photograph depicting a waterfront with stone quays, a paved ramp leading down to the water's edge, a fortress on the left edge of the picture, and spires, domes and multi-story buildings in the background
1864年，阿根廷首都布宜诺斯艾利斯

尽管红党加入了弗洛雷斯的叛乱行列，但国民警卫队坚持支持联合政府。警卫队开除了叛逃到弗洛雷斯那边的军官，然后让白党的游击队来填补空缺。[9]一些阿根廷联邦党（英语：Federales (Argentina)）党员为了支持白党，加入了白党的队伍。像乌拉圭一样，阿根廷也遭受过长期的内斗，不过在1861年的帕翁战役中，米特雷领导的集权党大胜胡斯托·何塞·德·乌尔基萨领导的联邦党，标志着集权党在阿根廷内战中的胜利。米特雷否认自己介入了弗洛雷斯的叛乱，然而，他与红党的同盟广为人知，并被认为是理所当然。[10]

Relations between Argentina and Uruguay worsened, and both nations came close to declaring war on each other, although neither could afford a direct military conflict. Argentina had only recently emerged from a long civil war, and was still struggling to suppress a Federalist rebellion in its western province of La Rioja. Uruguay was too weak militarily to engage in a fight unaided.[11][12]

Since 1862, the Blancos had made repeated overtures to Paraguay, governed by dictator Carlos Antonio López, in an attempt to forge an alliance[13][14] that might advance both their interests in the Platine region.[15][16] Upon the death of López, his son, Francisco Solano López, succeeded him as Paraguayan dictator. Unlike the elder López, who strove to avoid encumbering alliances, Solano greeted the Blancos' proposal with enthusiasm. He believed Argentina was working towards the annexation of both Uruguay and Paraguay, with the goal of recreating the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, the former Spanish colony that once encompassed the territories of all three nations. Solano López had, as far back as 1855, expressed this concern, commenting to the Uruguayan Andrés Lamas that "the idea of reconstructing [the old viceroyalty] is in the soul of the Argentines; and as a result, it isn't just Paraguay that needs to stand guard: your country, the Oriental Republic [of Uruguay], needs to get along with my own in order to prepare for any eventualities."[17] In late 1863, Solano López was mobilizing his army and was in talks with Urquiza, the leader of the dissident Argentine Federalists, to convince him to join the proposed Paraguayan–Uruguayan alliance.[18]

巴西和内战

Photographic aerial view of the city from a hillside with ships at anchor in the harbor and island in the background
Rio de Janeiro, capital of the Empire of Brazil, c. 1865

The developments in Uruguay were closely watched by the Empire of Brazil,[19] which had vital interests in the Río de la Plata Basin. After Rosas fell in 1852, Brazil became the dominant regional power. Its foreign policy included the covert underwriting of opposition parties in Uruguay and Argentina, preventing strong governments that might threaten Brazil's strategic position in the area. Brazilian banking and commercial firms also had ventures in the area, furthering ties within the region. In Uruguay, the bank run by Irineu Evangelista de Sousa (Baron and later Viscount of Mauá) became so heavily involved in commercial enterprises that the economy depended on this source of continued capital flow.[20][21]

About 18 percent (40,000) of the Uruguayan population (220,000) spoke Portuguese and regarded themselves as Brazilian rather than Uruguayan.[B] Many within Flores' ranks were Brazilians, some hailing from the nearby Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul.[22][23] Life along the frontier between Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay was often chaotic, with hostilities erupting between partisans of various cattle barons, cattle-rustling and random killings. Large landowners on both sides of the border had long been antagonistic toward Berro's policies.[24] The Uruguayan president attempted to tax the cattle coming from Rio Grande do Sul and to impose curbs on the use of Brazilian slaves within Uruguayan territory; slavery had been outlawed years before in Uruguay.[25]

Among the Brazilian land barons were David Canabarro and Antônio de Sousa Neto, both allies of Flores and former separatist rebels during the Ragamuffin War that had ravaged Rio Grande do Sul from 1835 until 1845.[26] Canabarro, a frontier military commander, misled Brazil's government by denying that Brazilians were crossing the border to join Flores.[27] Sousa Neto went to the Brazilian capital to request immediate government intervention in Uruguay, claiming that Brazilians were being murdered and their ranches robbed.[28] The "fact that Uruguayan citizens had just as valid claims against Brazil as Brazilians had against Uruguay was ignored", said historian Philip Raine.[29] Although Sousa Neto had ties with the governing political party, his claims, including that he could amass a force of 40,000 to invade Uruguay, were not taken seriously by all.[C] The Uruguayan crisis arrived at a difficult moment for Brazil, which was on the verge of a full-blown war with the British Empire for unrelated reasons. Brazil's government decided to intervene in Uruguay, fearful of showing any weakness in the face of an impending conflict with Britain, and believing that it would be better for the central government to take the lead rather than allow the Brazilian ranchers on the frontier to decide the course of events.[30]

Early engagements

Brazilian ultimatum

A steamship anchored to a mooring buoy with other ships in the distance
The steam frigate Amazonas served as part of the Brazilian naval fleet during the war.[31]

On 1 March 1864, Berro's term of office ended. The ongoing civil war prevented elections; therefore Atanasio Aguirre, president of the Uruguayan senate and a member of the Amapolas (the radical wing of the Blanco Party) replaced Berro, on an interim basis.[32][33] In April, José Antônio Saraiva was appointed minister plenipotentiary by the Brazilian government and charged with quickly reaching an accord that would settle Brazil's claims and ensure the safety of Brazilian citizens. His focus soon shifted from satisfying Brazil's terms to a more immediate goal of hammering out a deal between the antagonists in the civil war, with the expectation that only a more stable regime would be able to reach a settlement with Brazil.[34][35]

The government in Montevideo was at first reluctant to consider Saraiva's proposals. With backing from Paraguay, it saw little advantage in negotiating a close to the civil war or in seeking to comply with Brazil's demands.[36] The main factor, as historian Jeffrey D. Needell summarized, was that the "Uruguayan president had been unwilling to resolve these, particularly because the Brazilians whose grievances were at issue were allies of Venancio Flores, a client of the Argentines, and a man who was seeking his overthrow."[37] A mutual enmity between Brazil and its Hispanic-American neighbors compounded the difficulties, the result of a long-standing distrust and rivalry between Spain and Portugal that had been carried over to their former American colonies.[38] Brazil and Uruguay exhibited loathing for one another; as Robert Bontine Cunninghame Graham put it: "the Brazilians holding the Uruguayans as bloodthirsty savages, and the Uruguayans returning their contempt for the unwarlike ways of the Brazilians, whom they called monkeys, and looked down upon, for their mixed blood."[38]

Eventually, in July 1864, Saraiva's persistent diplomacy moved the Uruguayan government to agree to mediated talks including Edward Thornton (the British resident minister in Buenos Aires), Argentine foreign minister Rufino de Elizalde and Saraiva himself.[39] Initially, the negotiations seemed promising, but soon bogged down. On 4 August, convinced that the government in Montevideo was unwilling to work toward a settlement, a frustrated Saraiva delivered an ultimatum, which the Uruguayans rebuffed. On 10 August, Saraiva informed Aguirre that the Brazilian military commanders would receive orders to begin retaliation, marking the beginning of the war.[40]

Alliance with rebel Colorados

Photograph showing the hulk of a side-wheel steamship sitting very high in shallow water and heavily listing adjacent to a beach with other ships in the background
The Uruguayan steamship Villa del Salto after it ran aground and was set on fire by its crew

Under the orders of Vice-Admiral Joaquim Marques Lisboa (Baron of Tamandaré), a Brazilian fleet was stationed in Uruguayan territorial waters. The naval force comprised twelve steamships: one frigate, six corvettes and five gunboats.[31] On 11 August 1864, Tamandaré, as the commander-in-chief of Brazilian naval and land forces in the war,[41] received orders from Saraiva to begin retaliatory operations.[42] Brazilian warships were deployed to the Uruguayan towns of Salto, Paysandú and Maldonado, ostensibly to "protect Brazilian subjects", while Uruguay's only warships, the small steamers Villa del Salto and General Artigas, were to be neutralized.[43] When Tamandaré demanded these steamships remain at their docks, only the crew of General Artigas complied.[44]

Tamandaré created a naval command assigned to Captain of Sea and War Francisco Pereira Pinto (later Baron of Ivinhema). Consisting of two corvettes and one gunboat, the division was sent to patrol the Uruguay River, a tributary of the Río de la Plata and part of the Platine region.[31][43] On 24 August, Pereira Pinto sighted the Villa del Salto, which was conveying troops to fight the Colorados. The Villa del Salto ignored warning shots and a demand to surrender; after a desperate run from the Brazilian warships, it escaped to Argentine waters.[45] This first skirmish of the war prompted the Uruguayan government to sever all diplomatic ties with Brazil on 30 August.[46] On 7 September, Pereira Pinto again encountered the Villa del Salto sailing from Salto to Paysandú. The two Brazilian corvettes attacked the Uruguayan ship as it again tried to escape to Argentina. The battle ended when the Villa del Salto ran aground near Paysandú, where its crew set it on fire to prevent it falling into Brazilian hands.[47] Meanwhile, the General Artigas had been sold to prevent its capture by the Brazilians.[48]

To Flores, Brazil's military operations against the Blanco government represented a priceless opportunity, since he had been unable to achieve any lasting results during the rebellion. He entered talks with Saraiva, winning the Brazilian government over, after promising to settle their claims refused by the Blanco government. The Brazilian plenipotentiary minister gave instructions to Tamandaré to form a joint offensive with the Colorado leader and overthrow the Blancos.[49] On 20 October, after a swift exchange of letters, Flores and the Brazilian vice-admiral formed a secret alliance.[50]

Colorado–Brazil joint offensive

Sieges of Uruguayan towns

Photograph showing men and women in civilian dress lining a riverbank with small boats nearing the bank and large steamships in the distance near the opposite bank
Civilians departing Paysandú during the siege, 1864

The Brazilian naval fleet in Uruguay was supposed to work in conjunction with a Brazilian land force. But months passed, and the "Army of the South" (called the "Division of Observation" until the ultimatum) stationed in Piraí Grande (in Rio Grande do Sul) was still not ready to cross into Uruguayan territory. Its main objectives were to occupy the Uruguayan towns of Paysandú, Salto and Melo; once taken, they were to be handed over to Flores and his Colorados.[51]

On 12 October, a brigade led by Brigadier José Luís Mena Barreto detached from the main army. Two days later, near the Brazilian town of Jaguarão, the force invaded Uruguay's Cerro Largo Department. After skirmishes failed to halt their march, the Blancos abandoned Melo, and the brigade entered this capital of Cerro Largo unopposed, on 16 October. After handing over control of Melo to the Uruguayan Colorados, the Brazilians withdrew on 24 October, to rejoin their Army of the South.[52] The next Brazilian target was Salto. Pereira Pinto sent two gunboats under First Lieutenant Joaquim José Pinto to blockade the town. On 24 November, Flores arrived with his troops and began the siege. Colonel José Palomeque, commander of the Uruguayan garrison, surrendered almost without firing a shot, on the afternoon of 28 November.[53] Flores' army captured and incorporated four artillery pieces and 250 men;[54] 300 Colorados and 150 Brazilians were left behind to occupy Salto.[54]

Paysandú, the last Brazilian target, was already under blockade by Pereira Pinto.[55] Tamandaré, who had been in Buenos Aires until this point, took charge of the blockade on 3 December. It was enforced by one corvette and four gunboats.[56][57] Paysandú was garrisoned by 1,274 men and 15 cannons, under the command of Colonel Leandro Gómez.[58] Flores, who had come from Salto, headed a force of 3,000 men, mostly cavalry.[56] He invested Paysandú, deploying 800 infantrymen, 7 cannons (3 of which were rifled), and detachments of an additional 660 Brazilians.[59] Gómez declined the offer to surrender.[56][57] From 6 December until 8 December, the Brazilians and Colorados made attempts to storm the town, advancing through the streets, but were unable to take it.[60] Tamandaré and Flores opted to wait for the arrival of the Army of the South.[60] Meanwhile, Aguirre had sent General Juan Sáa with 3,000 men and four cannons to relieve the besieged town, forcing the Brazilians and Colorados to briefly lift the siege while dealing with this new threat. Sáa abandoned his advance before encountering the enemy force, and fled north of the Río Negro.[61]

Army of the South in Paysandú

主条目：Siege of Paysandú
Photograph of a line of uniformed soldiers ranged along a river bank in the foreground with boats on the river in the background
Brazilian navy and army troops during the siege of Paysandú, 1865

Rather than the show of force that had been intended by the Brazilian government, the war revealed the Empire's lack of military readiness. The Army of the South, stationed in Piraí Grande, was commanded by Field Marshal João Propício Mena Barreto (later Baron of São Gabriel) with two divisions. The 1st Division, under Brigadier Manuel Luís Osório (later Marquis of Erval), was formed by regular army units. The 2nd Division, under Brigadier José Luís Mena Barreto (who had since returned from his attack on Melo), was composed entirely of national guardsmen. Altogether, it numbered only 5,711 men—all (except some officers) native to Rio Grande do Sul.[D] The army was poorly equipped for siege operations: it brought along no engineers (who could direct the construction of trenches); it was under-equipped, lacking even hatchets (necessary to cut fences, break through doors and scale walls); and its 12 cannons (a mix of La Hitte and Paixhans) were of small calibers ill-suited to attacking fortifications.[62]

On 1 December, almost four months after Saraiva presented the ultimatum, the Army of the South invaded Uruguay.[63] Its troops were accompanied by a semi-independent militia unit, consisting of no more than 1,300 Brazilian gaucho cavalrymen, under the former Ragamuffin Antônio de Sousa Neto.[64] The 7,011-strong force (with 200 supply carts)[63] marched through Uruguayan territory unopposed, heading toward Paysandú in the southwest. The disorganized and undisciplined bands of gauchos, who formed the armies of both Blancos and Colorados, were no match for the Brazilian troops. The Uruguayan gauchos "had combat experience but no training and were poorly armed save for the usual muskets, boleadoras, and facón knives", remarked historian Thomas L. Whigham.[65] "Fire arms he [the Uruguayan gaucho] rarely possessed", said Cunninghame Graham, "or if by chance he owned a pair of long brass-mounted pistols or a flintlock blunderbuss, they were in general out of order and unserviceable. Upon the other hand, a little training made him a formidable adversary with the sabre and the lance."[66]

Field Marshal João Propício Mena Barreto reached Paysandú on 29 December with two infantry brigades and one artillery regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Émile Louis Mallet (later Baron of Itapevi).[63][67] The Army of the South's cavalry established its camp a few kilometers away.[63][68] Meanwhile, Gómez beheaded forty Colorados[69] and fifteen Brazilian prisoners and "hung their still-dripping heads above his trenches in full view of their compatriots."[70] On 31 December, the Brazilians and Colorados recommenced their attack and overran the city's defenses, after a bitter struggle, on 2 January 1865.[68][71] The Brazilians captured Gómez and handed him over to the Colorados. Colonel Gregorio "Goyo" Suárez shot Gómez and three of his officers.[72][73] According to Whigham, "Suárez's actions were not really unexpected, as several members of his immediate family had fallen victim to Gómez's wrath against the Colorados."[74]

Blanco capitulation

Further operations

Uruguay with lines drawn down the western and southwestern side of the country, a short arrow in the northeast, and another line bisecting the country from east to west
The route taken by the Army of the South during the war

On 12 November 1864, before the siege of Paysandú, the Paraguayan dictator Solano López seized the Brazilian steamer Marquês de Olinda, beginning the Paraguayan War. While the Army of the South crossed Uruguay heading toward Paysandú, Brazil's government sent José Maria da Silva Paranhos (later Viscount of Rio Branco) to replace Saraiva. He arrived in the Argentine capital of Buenos Aires on 2 December and a few days later sought a formal alliance with Mitre against the Blancos. The Argentine president refused, insisting that neither he nor his government had any role in Flores' rebellion, and that Argentina would remain neutral.[75] On 26 December, the Paraguayans invaded the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso, laying waste to towns and the countryside.[76][77]

As the situation deteriorated, the Brazilian government mobilized army units from other regions of the Empire. On 1 January 1865, one brigade (composed of two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) with 1,700 men from the Brazilian province of Rio de Janeiro disembarked and occupied the Uruguayan town of Fray Bentos.[78] Paranhos, along with Tamandaré, met Flores in Fray Bentos and decided to launch a combined attack against Montevideo.[79] It was apparent that the Paraguayans would take too long to reach Uruguay and no help would come from Urquiza and his Argentine Federalists.[80] Increasingly isolated, Aguirre hoped that the foreign powers could intervene, but when, on 11 January, he asked the diplomatic corps in Montevideo whether they would provide military assistance to him and his government, none responded positively.[81][82] João Propício Mena Barreto sailed from Fray Bentos on 14 January with the Brazilian infantry, bound for a landing near the mouth of the Santa Lucía River near Montevideo.[83] On the way, he occupied the Uruguayan town of Colonia del Sacramento, garrisoning it with 50 soldiers.[84]

The cavalry and artillery were placed under Osório and went overland. They met João Propício Mena Barreto and the infantry at their landing place. From there, the reunited Army of the South marched on Montevideo.[84] On 31 January, Brazil and the Colorados besieged the Uruguayan capital.[84][85] In the meantime, on 19 January, Paranhos attempted to clarify the nature of the Brazilian operations against the Blancos. He issued notes to the foreign diplomatic corps in Buenos Aires declaring that a state of war existed between Brazil and Uruguay. Until then, there had been no formal declaration of war, and the Empire's military operations in Uruguay since August 1864 had been mere "reprisals"—the vague term used by Brazilian diplomacy since the ultimatum.[86]

Armistice

Photograph from an elevated vantage point looking over the rooftops of multistory buildings in a crowded downtown district toward a large bay with many steam and sailing ships riding at anchor and a mountain in the distance on the other side of the inlet
Montevideo, capital of Uruguay, 1865

In an attempt to divert the attention of Brazil from the siege of the capital, the Blanco government ordered the "Vanguard Army of the Republic of Uruguay", composed of 1,500 men under General Basilio Muñoz, to invade Brazilian soil. On 27 January 1865, Muñoz crossed the border and exchanged fire with 500 cavalrymen from Brazil's National Guard units. The Brazilians retreated to the town of Jaguarão, where they were joined by 90 infantrymen also from the National Guard, and hurriedly constructed trenches. There were also two small steamers and one other large vessel, each equipped with one artillery piece, to protect Jaguarão. The Blanco army attacked the town in the Battle of Jaguarão, but were repelled. Muñoz established a brief siege and asked Colonel Manuel Pereira Vargas (the commander of the Brazilian garrison) to surrender, but to no effect. In the early hours of 28 January, Muñoz retreated with his men toward Uruguay, ransacking property and taking all the slaves they could find.[E]

On 2 February, Tamandaré declared to foreign diplomats that Montevideo was under siege and blockade.[87] The Uruguayan capital was defended by between 3,500 and 4,000 armed men with little to no combat experience and 40 artillery pieces of various calibers.[88] On 16 February, the Army of the South was further reinforced by 1,228 men from the 8th Battalion of Caçadores (Sharpshooters) arriving from the Brazilian province of Bahia, raising its numbers to 8,116.[89] Sousa Neto and his gauchos had detached from the main force weeks before to pursue Muñoz and his army.[90] British and French nationals were evacuated to Buenos Aires. The "general exodus of foreigners that followed caused those who remained in Montevideo to feel terror for the first time. All agreed that a full-scale assault against the city could not be postponed."[91] However, neither Paranhos nor his government were willing to risk the destruction of Montevideo and face the inevitable outcry from other nations that would follow it.[92]

On 15 February, Aguirre's term of office expired.[93] Against the wishes of the Amapolas, the moderate Tomás Villalba was elected by the Senate to replace Aguirre. French, Italian and Spanish troops landed in Montevideo at Villalba's request to dissuade the radical Blancos from attempting a coup to retake power.[94] Villalba entered into talks with Flores and Paranhos. With the Italian resident minister Raffaele Ulisse Barbolani serving as intermediary, an agreement was reached. Flores and Manuel Herrera y Obes (representing Villalba's government) signed a peace accord on 20 February at the Villa de la Unión. A general amnesty was granted to both Blancos and Colorados, and Villalba handed over the presidency to Flores on an interim basis until elections could be held.[95]

Aftermath

Photograph showing lines of soldiers assembled in a square facing a large wooden cross in the center and a low building or pavilion with 2 flanking spires hung with bells in the background
Brazilian troops in Rio Grande do Sul heading toward the front, 1865
主条目：Paraguayan War

In early March, Flores assembled a cabinet composed entirely of Colorados, among them a brother of the Blanco Leandro Gómez.[96] The new Uruguayan president purged government departments of employees with Fusionist or Blanco associations. All Blanco officers and enlisted men were eliminated from the army and replaced by those Colorado and Brazilian loyalists who had remained with Flores throughout the conflict. Public commemorations glorified the Colorados, and a monument dedicated to the "Martyrs of Quinteros" was erected.[97] The costs of the Liberating Crusade are unknown. Flores' losses amounted to around 450 dead and wounded;[98] there are no estimates of the number of civilians who died of famine and disease, nor is it known how much damage was sustained by the national economy. The effects of the Uruguayan War have received little attention from historians, who have been drawn to focus on the dramatic devastation suffered by Paraguay in the subsequent Paraguayan War.[F]

News of the war's end was brought by Pereira Pinto and met with joy in Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian Emperor Dom Pedro II found himself waylaid by a crowd of thousands in the streets amid acclamations.[99][100] But public opinion quickly changed for the worse, when newspapers began running stories painting the accord of 20 February as harmful to Brazilian interests, for which the cabinet was blamed. The newly raised Viscount of Tamandaré and Mena Barreto (now Baron of São Gabriel) had supported the peace accord.[101] Tamandaré changed his mind soon afterward and played along with the allegations. Paranhos (a member of the opposition party) was used as a scapegoat by the Emperor and the government, and was recalled in disgrace to the imperial capital.[102] Subsequent events show the accusation was unfounded. Not only had Paranhos managed to settle all Brazilian claims, but by avoiding the death of thousands, he gained a willing and grateful Uruguayan ally, not a dubious and resentful one — who provided Brazil an important base of operations during the war with Paraguay that followed.[103]

Victory brought mixed results for Brazil and Argentina. As the Brazilian government had expected, the conflict was a short-lived and relatively easy affair that led to the installation of a friendly government in Uruguay. The official estimates included 549 battlefield casualties (109 dead, 439 wounded and 1 missing) from the navy and army and an unknown number who died from disease.[96] Historian José Bernardino Bormann put the total at 616 (204 dead, 411 wounded and 1 missing).[98] The war would have been deemed an outstanding success for Brazil, had it not been for its terrible consequences. Instead of demonstrating strength, Brazil revealed military weakness that an emboldened Paraguay sought to exploit. From the Argentine viewpoint, most of Bartolomé Mitre's expectations were frustrated by the war's outcome. He had succeeded in bringing to power his friend and ally, but the minimal risk and cost to Argentina he had envisioned at the outset proved to be illusory. The resulting attack by Paraguay on Brazilian and Argentine provinces sparked the long and devastating Paraguayan War.[104]

Notes

  1. ^ 西班牙语：Invasión brasileña de 1864；葡萄牙语：Guerra do Uruguai。
  2. ^ According to the 1860 census, there were 220,000 inhabitants in Uruguay. Of this number, 120,000 spoke Spanish and considered themselves Uruguayans. All the others were considered foreigners, including 18,000 Spanish, 10,000 Italians and 9,000 French. These were European immigrants who had arrived following Uruguayan independence in 1828. Descendants of intermarriages between Brazilian and other nationalities living in Uruguay were not counted among the 40,000 figure. The Uruguayan foreign minister, Juan José de Herrera, confirmed these numbers to Saraiva in 1864 (Golin 2004，第194, 249页).
  3. ^ Luís Alves de Lima e Silva (Marquis and later Duke of Caxias) best illustrated the skepticism of, and opposition to, Neto when he bluntly responded that not even 1,000 men could be gathered, much less 40,000, to fight this war (Costa 1996，第133页).
  4. ^ The Empire did not rely upon general conscription, and only later mobilized additional units from other provinces. José Paranhos, Baron of Rio Branco, in his notes on Louis Schneider's work, and José Bernardino Bormann said that the Army of the South had 5,711 men (Schneider 2009，第63页; Bormann 1907，第180页). Gustavo Barroso and Augusto Tasso Fragoso gave round numbers: 5,700 and 6,000, respectively (Barroso 1935，第207页; Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第146页).
  5. ^ A few books claim that Muñoz's men raped Brazilian women during their retreat from Jaguarão (Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第246–247页; Osório & Osório 1915，第20–21页). The sole contemporary source mentioning the rapes was an article in a gazette (Schneider 2009，第102页). The attack on Jaguarão only became widely known following an official report submitted by the president (governor) of Rio Grande do Sul, in which there is no mention of violence toward Brazilian women, only of looting and the kidnapping of slaves.(Schneider 2009，第88–89, 102页; Golin 2004，第304–305页; Bormann 1907，第210–215页). It is known that one Brazilian (a former Ragamuffin officer) was castrated and had his ears cut off after he was killed, a common practice among gauchos (Bormann 1907，第215页).
  6. ^ No figures are given in classic contemporary works such as George Thompson's The War in Paraguay (published in 1869), George Frederick Masterman's Seven eventful years in Paraguay (1870), Richard Francis Burton's Letters from the battlefields of Paraguay (1870), Charles Ames Washburn's The History of Paraguay (1871), Max von Versen's Reisen in Amerika und der Südamerikanische Krieg (1872) and Louis Schneider's Der Krieg der Triple-Allianz (1872–75). The subject is also ignored in later, well-known histories such as José Bernardino Bormann's A Campanha do Uruguai (1907), Augusto Tasso Fragoso's História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguai (1934) and Francisco Doratioto's Maldita guerra: nova história da Guerra do Paraguai (2002). The same omission is found in English-language works that deal with the war, such as Thomas L. Whigham's The Paraguayan War: Causes and early conduct (2002), Chris Leuchars' To the bitter end: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance (2002), Hendrik Kraay and Thomas L. Whigham's I die with my country: perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870 (2004) and Terry D. Hooker's The Paraguayan War (2008).

References

  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Kraay & Whigham 2004，第119页.
  2. ^ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Kraay & Whigham 2004，第120页.
  3. ^ Munro 1960，第201–202页.
  4. ^ Leuchars 2002，第20页.
  5. ^ Whigham 2002，第124页.
  6. ^ 6.0 6.1 Kraay & Whigham 2004，第121页.
  7. ^ 见：
  8. ^ 见：
  9. ^ Kraay & Whigham 2004，第122页.
  10. ^ 见：
  11. ^ Whigham 2002，第138–139页.
  12. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第107–114页.
  13. ^ Whigham 2002，第139–140页.
  14. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第162–180页.
  15. ^ Whigham 2002，第140–141页.
  16. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第164, 169页.
  17. ^ Whigham 2002，第441页.
  18. ^ Whigham 2002，第142页.
  19. ^ Whigham 2002，第144页.
  20. ^ Whigham 2002，第123页.
  21. ^ Bethell 1985，第662页.
  22. ^ Golin 2004，第200–202, 218, 268–269页.
  23. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第116页.
  24. ^ See:
  25. ^ See:
  26. ^ Golin 2004，第243页.
  27. ^ Golin 2004，第201–202页.
  28. ^ See:
  29. ^ Raine 1956，第161页.
  30. ^ See:
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Maia 1975，第260页.
  32. ^ Whigham 2002，第148–149页.
  33. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第107页.
  34. ^ Raine 1956，第161–162页.
  35. ^ Whigham 2002，第147–151页.
  36. ^ Raine 1956，第162页.
  37. ^ Needell 2006，第240页.
  38. ^ 38.0 38.1 Graham 1933，第127页.
  39. ^ See:
  40. ^ See:
  41. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第258–259页.
  42. ^ Golin 2004，第271页.
  43. ^ 43.0 43.1 Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第137页.
  44. ^ See:
  45. ^ See:
  46. ^ Maia 1975，第263页.
  47. ^ See:
  48. ^ Golin 2004，第282, 286页.
  49. ^ Golin 2004，第287–290页.
  50. ^ See:
  51. ^ See:
  52. ^ See:
  53. ^ See:
  54. ^ 54.0 54.1 Schneider 2009，第67页.
  55. ^ Schneider 2009，第65页.
  56. ^ 56.0 56.1 56.2 Schneider 2009，第70页.
  57. ^ 57.0 57.1 Maia 1975，第264页.
  58. ^ See:
  59. ^ See:
  60. ^ 60.0 60.1 See:
  61. ^ See:
  62. ^ Schneider 2009，第63, 77页.
  63. ^ 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.3 Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第154页.
  64. ^ See:
  65. ^ Whigham 2002，第174页.
  66. ^ Graham 1933，第122–123页.
  67. ^ Maia 1975，第265页.
  68. ^ 68.0 68.1 Maia 1975，第266页.
  69. ^ Barroso 1935，第206页.
  70. ^ Whigham 2002，第458页.
  71. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第154–155页.
  72. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第155页.
  73. ^ Bormann 1907，第202–203页.
  74. ^ Whigham 2002，第459页.
  75. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第160–161页.
  76. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第227页.
  77. ^ Leuchars 2002，第35页.
  78. ^ See:
  79. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第158页.
  80. ^ Whigham 2002，第227–228页.
  81. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第247–248页.
  82. ^ Schneider 2009，第87页.
  83. ^ Schneider 2009，第88页.
  84. ^ 84.0 84.1 84.2 Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第159页.
  85. ^ Silva 1906b，第239页.
  86. ^ See:
  87. ^ See:
  88. ^ Schneider 2009，第83, 86页.
  89. ^ Schneider 2009，第82页.
  90. ^ Bormann 1907，第214页.
  91. ^ Whigham 2002，第235页.
  92. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第249页.
  93. ^ See:
  94. ^ See:
  95. ^ See:
  96. ^ 96.0 96.1 Schneider 2009，第104页.
  97. ^ Kraay & Whigham 2004，第123页.
  98. ^ 98.0 98.1 Bormann 1907，第294页.
  99. ^ Bormann 1907，第281页.
  100. ^ Tasso Fragoso 2009, Vol 1，第254页.
  101. ^ Schneider 2009，第99页.
  102. ^ Needell 2006，第227页.
  103. ^ See:
  104. ^ Golin 2004，第200, 210, 314页.

Bibliography

  • Barroso, Gustavo. História Militar do Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional. 1935 （Portuguese）. 
  • Bethell, Leslie. The Cambridge History of Latin America 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. ISBN 0-521-23224-4. 
  • Bormann, José Bernardino. A Campanha do Uruguay (1864–65). Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional. 1907 （Portuguese）. 
  • Carvalho, José Murilo de. D. Pedro II: Ser ou Não Ser. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras. 2007. ISBN 978-85-359-0969-2 （Portuguese）. 
  • Costa, Wilma Peres. A Espada de Dâmocles: o Exército, a Guerra do Paraguai e a Crise do Império. São Paulo: HUCITEC. 1996. ISBN 85-271-0245-5 （Portuguese）. 
  • Golin, Tau. A Fronteira 2. Porto Alegre: L&PM. 2004. ISBN 978-85-254-1438-0 （Portuguese）. 
  • Graham, Robert Bontine Cunninghame. Portrait of a Dictator. London: William Heinemann. 1933. 
  • Hooker, Terry D. The Paraguayan War. Nottingham: Foundry Books. 2008. ISBN 1-901543-15-3. 
  • Kraay, Hendrik; Whigham, Thomas L. I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870. Dexter, Michigan: Thomson-Shore. 2004. ISBN 978-0-8032-2762-0. 
  • Leuchars, Chris. To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 2002. ISBN 0-313-32365-8. 
  • Maia, Prado. A Marinha de Guerra do Brasil na Colônia e no Império 2. Rio de Janeiro: Cátedra. 1975 （Portuguese）. 
  • Munro, Dana Gardner. The Latin American Republics: A History 3. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1960. 
  • Needell, Jeffrey D. The Party of Order: the Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2006. ISBN 978-0-8047-5369-2. 
  • Osório, Joaquim Luís; Osório, Fernando Luís. História do General Osório 1. Pelotas: Tipografia do Diário Popular. 1915 （Portuguese）. 
  • Raine, Philip. Paraguay. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press. 1956. 
  • Schneider, Louis. A Guerra da Tríplice Aliança Contra o Paraguai. Porto Alegre: Pradense. 2009. ISBN 978-85-89072-13-7 （Portuguese）. 
  • Silva, Alfredo Pretextato Maciel da. Os Generais do Exército Brasileiro de 1822 a 1889: Traços Biográficos 2. Rio de Janeiro: M. Orosco & C. 1906b （Portuguese）. 
  • Tasso Fragoso, Augusto. História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguai 1 3. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército. 2009 （Portuguese）. 
  • Williams, Mary Wilhelmine. Dom Pedro the Magnanimous, Second Emperor of Brazil. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. 1937. 
  • Whigham, Thomas L. The Paraguayan War: Causes and Early Conduct 1. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 2002. ISBN 978-0-8032-4786-4. 

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