因果的封閉性

物理的因果封閉性是一個形上學的理論，關於physical領域中因果的本質，在形上學和心靈哲學研究中有重要影響。很強的描述是這樣的：物理的因果封閉性認為，「所有物理狀態都是『純粹的』物理結果」（金在權語）^[1] ，或者說，「物理結果『只能』有物理原因」（Agustin Vincente語）。^[2]

大部分接受這個理論的人，傾向於接受物理主義觀點，即所有實體都存在且是物理實體。正如卡爾·波普爾說道，「物理主義者地原則是物理的封閉性……具有決定性意義的重要性，而且我把它當作是物理主義或唯物主義的原則。」^[3]

定義

物理的因果封閉性有強和弱兩種形式。^[4]

強的形式斷言，沒有任何物理活動有物理領域之外的原因（金在權語）。^[1] 也就是說，斷言對於所有物理事件，除物理原因之外的所有原因都不存在。^[5]

弱的形式斷言，「所有物理事件都有物理原因。」（Barbara Montero語）^[4] 或者，「所有物理的結果都有物理上充足的原因。」（Agustin Vincente語）^[2] 或者，「如果我們跟蹤物理時間的因果來源，我們需要永遠不走出物理領域。」（金在權語）^[1] 弱的物理因果封閉性和因果完全性是同義詞，^[6] 即「所有物理結果都有充足的物理原因」。^[5] 也就是說，弱形式允許，在物理原因之外，增加一些可能不是物理性質的，但能造成物理結果的原因。

還原論的概念補充了物理的因果封閉性，認為所有事件都可以最終地還原到物理事件。在這些情況下，心靈事件是物理事件的子集和結果。^[7]

重要性

批評

物理因果的封閉性，其有效性一直遭到質疑。^[8] 當代，有人指出科學紮根於通過調查剔除主觀的東西，尋找客觀的東西。以觀察者的身份，第三人稱的視角，有些哲學家認為是永遠不能驗證主觀問題的（例如意識和自由意志）。^[9]^[10]^[11] 還有批評認為，由Hodgson的討論，科學自己不能支撐物理因果的封閉性。^[12] 還有哲學家批判了這一論證，即支持目的論和基於靈魂的心物關係來論證物理因果的封閉性。^[13]

忽視現象

參見

參考

^ ^1.0 ^1.1 ^1.2 Jaegwon Kim. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press. 1993: 280 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 978-0521439961. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.
^ ^2.0 ^2.1 Vicente, A. On the Causal Completeness of Physics (PDF). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2006, 20 (2): 149–171 [2020-02-24]. doi:10.1080/02698590600814332. （原始內容存檔 (PDF)於2016-03-04）.
^ Popper and Eccles, Karl. The Self and its Brain. New York: Springer. 1977: 51. ISBN 978-0415058988.
^ ^4.0 ^4.1 Barbara Montero. Chapter 8: Varieties of causal closure. Sven Walter; Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (編). Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. 2003: 173 ff [2020-02-24]. ISBN 978-0907845461. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.
^ ^5.0 ^5.1 Sahotra Sarkar; Jessica Pfeifer. Physicalism. The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis: 566. 2006. ISBN 978-0415977104. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）使用|archiveurl=需要含有|url= (幫助). |chapter=被忽略 (幫助);
^ Max Velmans; Susan Schneider. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. John Wiley & Sons. 15 April 2008 [6 February 2013]. ISBN 978-0-470-75145-9. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.
^ Jaegwon Kim. The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 1989, 63 (3): 31–47. JSTOR 3130081. doi:10.2307/3130081.
^ Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland. Editors' introduction: The volitional brain. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. 2000: ix–xxii [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780907845119. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.
^ > FT Hong. Vladimir B. Bajić; Tin Wee Tan , 編. Information Processing and Living Systems. Imperial College Press. 2005: 388 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9781860946882. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）. The origination of free will is an illusion from the third-person perspective. However, it is a reality from the first-person perspective...
^ > Thomas Nagel. Chapter 4: Cognition. Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. 2012: 71 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780199919758. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）. [Higher-level cognitive capacities] cannot be understood through physical science alone, and..their existence cannot be explained by a version of evolutionary theory that is physically reductive.
^ U Mohrhoff. The physics of interactionism. Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland (編). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. 2000: 166 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780907845119. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）. But the laws of physics presuppose causal closure...Hence it follows that the behaviour of matter in the presence of a causally efficacious non-material mind cannot be fully governed by those laws.
^ David Hodgson. Chapter 7: Science and determinism. Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will. Oxford University Press. 2012 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780199845309. （原始內容存檔於2020-08-01）. Hodgson relies upon the free will theorem（英語：free will theorem）^1,² of scientists John Conway and Simon Kochen based upon the role of the observer in quantum mechanics, which supports the view that "belief in determinism may thus come to be seen as notably unscientific." (p. 121)
^ Stewart Goetz; Charles Taliaferro. Strict naturalism, purposeful explanation, and freedom. Naturalism (Intervensions) Paperback. Eerdmans. 2008: 26 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 978-0802807687. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.

[Kim1-1] 1.0 ^1.1 ^1.2 Jaegwon Kim. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press. 1993: 280 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 978-0521439961. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.

[Vicente-2] 2.0 ^2.1 Vicente, A. On the Causal Completeness of Physics (PDF). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2006, 20 (2): 149–171 [2020-02-24]. doi:10.1080/02698590600814332. （原始內容存檔 (PDF)於2016-03-04）.

[Popper-3] Popper and Eccles, Karl. The Self and its Brain. New York: Springer. 1977: 51. ISBN 978-0415058988.

[Montero-4] 4.0 ^4.1 Barbara Montero. Chapter 8: Varieties of causal closure. Sven Walter; Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (編). Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. 2003: 173 ff [2020-02-24]. ISBN 978-0907845461. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.

[Sarkar-5] 5.0 ^5.1 Sahotra Sarkar; Jessica Pfeifer. Physicalism. The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis: 566. 2006. ISBN 978-0415977104. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）使用|archiveurl=需要含有|url= (幫助). |chapter=被忽略 (幫助);

[VelmansSchneider2008-6] Max Velmans; Susan Schneider. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. John Wiley & Sons. 15 April 2008 [6 February 2013]. ISBN 978-0-470-75145-9. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.

[Kim2-7] Jaegwon Kim. The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 1989, 63 (3): 31–47. JSTOR 3130081. doi:10.2307/3130081.

[Libet-8] Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland. Editors' introduction: The volitional brain. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. 2000: ix–xxii [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780907845119. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.

[Hong-9] > FT Hong. Vladimir B. Bajić; Tin Wee Tan , 編. Information Processing and Living Systems. Imperial College Press. 2005: 388 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9781860946882. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）. The origination of free will is an illusion from the third-person perspective. However, it is a reality from the first-person perspective...

[NagelT-10] > Thomas Nagel. Chapter 4: Cognition. Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. 2012: 71 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780199919758. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）. [Higher-level cognitive capacities] cannot be understood through physical science alone, and..their existence cannot be explained by a version of evolutionary theory that is physically reductive.

[Mohrhoff-11] U Mohrhoff. The physics of interactionism. Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland (編). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. 2000: 166 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780907845119. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）. But the laws of physics presuppose causal closure...Hence it follows that the behaviour of matter in the presence of a causally efficacious non-material mind cannot be fully governed by those laws.

[Hodgson-12] David Hodgson. Chapter 7: Science and determinism. Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will. Oxford University Press. 2012 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 9780199845309. （原始內容存檔於2020-08-01）. Hodgson relies upon the free will theorem（英語：free will theorem）^1,² of scientists John Conway and Simon Kochen based upon the role of the observer in quantum mechanics, which supports the view that "belief in determinism may thus come to be seen as notably unscientific." (p. 121)

[Goetz-13] Stewart Goetz; Charles Taliaferro. Strict naturalism, purposeful explanation, and freedom. Naturalism (Intervensions) Paperback. Eerdmans. 2008: 26 [2020-02-24]. ISBN 978-0802807687. （原始內容存檔於2017-02-24）.

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